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Abstract
This thesis investigates reelection moderation in the U.S. Senate on economic, 
social, and foreign policy between 1983 and 1994. I test 3 hypotheses based on the 
assumption that senators moderate their voting records when seeking reelection to appeal 
to the median voter. My hypotheses are: (1) Both groups o f senators will moderate on 
economic policy, but a larger percentage o f Democrats will moderate than Republicans 
(2) A majority o f Democratic senators will moderate on social policy, but only a small 
percentage o f Republicans will moderate. (3) Less than a majority o f both groups o f 
senators will moderate on foreign policy, but a larger percentage o f Republicans will 
moderate than Democrats The percentages o f moderating and non-moderating senators 
are compared to determine the extent o f senatorial moderation. Democrats are 
moderating on economic and social policy. On foreign policy, the first two classes remain 
consistent over their six year terms, while the last two classes moderate. Republican 
voting records remain consistent in all 3 policy areas. These results provide the strongest 




The House and Senate are different types o f legislative institutions. The Senate, 
with its six-year terms and its allotment o f two senators per state is structurally different 
from the House, which has two-year terms and membership that is proportional by state 
population. The smaller districts and shorter terms o f House members were designed to 
insure that its members are in close contact with their constituencies. House members 
may have little voting leeway because an election is never more than two years away. 
Senators, on the other hand, are likely to display greater temporal variability in their 
voting records than House members because o f their longer terms, and typically, more 
heterogeneous constituencies. Being unresponsive to constituency preferences may be 
less costly when an election is six, five, four, or even three years away. It is at the end o f 
the term, as reelection approaches, that conforming to constituency preferences becomes 
more important, before this, senators may have considerable voting leeway.
The electorate is less attentive when reelection is three to six years away (Born 
1991; Jacobson 1997). This is when senators may be more likely to vote in a manner that 
is discordant with constituency preferences. I f  senators vote differently depending on the 
attentiveness o f the electorate, what is the resulting pattern? Specifically, is the roll-call 
voting behavior o f senators systematically different at the end o f their terms when 
compared to the beginning o f their terms? These questions will be answered through the 
investigation o f my research question: do senatorial voting records become more 
moderate as reelection approaches?
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The theoretical orientation o f the moderation hypothesis is derived from Downs’
An Economic Theory o f Democracy (1957). In a two-party system, rational parties and 
candidates tend to converge toward the preferences o f the median voter. This is the 
optimal strategy for obtaining votes in the general election. However, this movement is 
constrained by party identifiers who firmly hold more extreme positions and are more 
likely to vote than those who do not The resulting picture o f the electorate is one in 
which the majority o f voters, who converge in the center, are not as vocal, nor as firm in 
their preferences as are the outliers.
Shapiro, Brady, Brody, and Ferejohn (1990) provide evidence that supports this 
premise. Specifically, party identifiers are more extreme than independent voters. 
Moreover, independent voters have ideological preferences that are at, or quite near, the 
median o f constituency positions. The preferences o f both party identifiers and 
independents influence senatorial voting records, with the former being more influential 
(Shapiro et al. 1990). As a result o f the intensity o f senatorial campaigns (Born 1991; 
Jacobson 1997), inattentive publics will become more attuned. However, the ideological 
positions o f voters with less vocal preferences are harder to discern than those o f party 
identifiers (Downs 1957). This constraint suggests that moderating shifts, when they 
occur, will not be extreme.
Identifying voting patterns in the U.S. Senate is key to developing adequate 
models o f representation. I f  roll-call voting behavior consistently becomes more moderate 
during the end o f a term, is that the only time senators are responsive? Such a scenario 
would imply that senators behave as trustees early in their terms and become instructed
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delegates when seeking reelection. End-of-term moderating implies that elections provide 
accountability and an incentive for responsiveness, both o f which are key to democratic 
theory. However, i f  senators have to moderate their voting behavior in order to help 
ensure reelection, does this mean that they are not accountable and responsive at the 
beginning o f their terms?
Senators may be responsive in areas other than public policy. Accordingly, policy 
congruence is not the only component o f representation (Eulau and Karps 1977, Pitkin 
1967), but it is surely an integral part. McCrone and Kuklinski (1979) suggest that 
legislators are responsive to constituency preferences when two conditions exist. First, 
legislators must think o f themselves as delegates, and second, constituents must send 
consistent messages. This is why I think it is important to investigate end-of-term 
shifting, when these conditions are most likely to occur. This is when the electorate is 
most attentive as a result o f the intensity o f reelection campaigns. In addition, senators 
want to show that they are doing a “ good job” and may be more likely to pay attention to 
constituency preferences in order to achieve a reelection victory.
Other researchers have addressed the moderation hypothesis, but their findings 
have been inconsistent Furthermore, previous studies do not provide conclusive answers 
because the moderation hypothesis was not adequately tested. A ll o f the previous studies 
employ general measures o f ideology. Such measures do not distinguish between policy 
areas. I shall endeavor to add to previous research by testing the moderation hypothesis 
in discrete policy areas This approach w ill provide the resolution necessary to establish 
results that are more conclusive than those reported in the extant literature.
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Literature Review
There are four approaches to the debate over the extent and character o f 
moderation The first is the median voter theorem (Downs 1957), which states that 
senators moderate their voting records to appeal to the median voter (Elling 1982; Wright 
and Berkman 1986) The second group claims that end-of-term shifting is toward the 
position o f a likely opponent, not toward the preferences o f the median voter (Bernstein 
1991, Thomas 1985). Third, are Fiorina (1973) and Shapiro, Brady, Brody, and Ferejohn 
(1990), who investigate the two constituencies hypothesis They argue that senators are 
primarily responsive to their own party identifiers and are less responsive to those who 
identify with the other party. This results in extreme policy stances, not moderation. 
Finally, the fourth approach makes no prediction about the direction o f end-of-term 
shifting, only that senators become more responsive to constituency preferences as 
reelection approaches, even i f  that results in a more extreme voting record (Ahuja 1994; 
Amacher and Boyes 1978).
The Median Voter Theorem
To investigate the median-voter hypothesis, Elling (1982) employs Americans fo r 
Democratic Action (ADA) scores to measure the ideology o f senators. The results 
indicate that considerable shifting in ideological positions occurs over the course o f 
senatorial terms. Ninety percent o f senators shifted their voting records throughout their 
terms with 47 percent shifting ten units or more. These voting shifts appear to be a 
function o f the number o f years remaining in a senator's term. Fifty-three percent o f
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senators shifted in a more moderate direction with 25 percent o f those shifting ten units or 
more. Thirty-seven percent became less moderate, o f those, 17 percent shift at least ten 
units. Elling (1982) finds support for the moderation hypothesis. However, he uses a 
highly aggregated interest group rating to measure ideology and fails to exclude senators 
not seeking reelection.
The median voter hypothesis is also tested by Wright and Berkman (1986), who 
use survey data to develop a 10 point liberal-conservative scale to measure the ideology 
o f senators. They find that senators who are seeking reelection have more moderate 
voting records than their counterparts, who are three to six years away from reelection. 
In this study, Republicans are more moderate at election time than Democrats. Although 
this study only examines one year, Wright and Berkman (1986) provide further support 
that senators seeking reelection moderate their policy positions.
Ideological Shifts Toward Opponents
Bernstein (1991) employs A men cans fo r  Constitutional Action (ACA) scores to 
estimate the ideological positions o f senators. He finds that there is strategic shifting at 
election time. Democrats who are at the left o f the median voter and Republicans who are 
at the right move toward the preferences o f the median voter. However, conservative 
Democrats and liberal Republicans become more extreme, moving away from the median 
voter. These results lead Bernstein to conclude that senators are not moving toward 
constituency preferences, but instead toward the ideological positions o f their opponents.
Thomas (1985) uses Conservative Coalition support and opposition scores as his
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measures o f ideology. He finds that over the course o f senatorial terms voting records o f 
Republicans become more liberal, while the voting records o f Democrats become more 
conservative Also, the most moderate voting records are in the sixth year with the trend 
beginning after the third year. However, Thomas concludes that senators are not 
moderating, but instead moving toward the ideological positions o f their opponents.
Both Thomas (1985) and Bernstein (1991) base their conclusions on small subsets 
o f their samples The majority o f senators in both o f their studies moderate as elections 
approach. However, since a small group o f liberal Republicans and conservative 
Democrats become more extreme, they believe this indicates movement towards a likely 
opponent, not the median voter (Bernstein 1991; Thomas 1985). According to Bernstein 
and Thomas, the majority o f senators only appear to be moving toward the median voter. 
They assert that senators are trying to ideologically place themselves between their 
opponent and the majority o f voters (Bernstein 1991, Thomas 1985).
The Two-Constituencies Hypothesis
Fiorina (1973) uses two case studies o f marginal switch districts to counter the 
idea that intense electoral competition will produce moderate legislators. Marginal switch 
districts are those in which a representative wins an election with less than 55 percent o f 
the vote and then loses the next election by a similar margin. In the first study, switches in 
party control result in an average difference o f 73 percentage points in Conservative 
Coalition scores. “ In almost every case the Democrat replacing a Republican or the 
Republican replacing a Democrat gave the constituency an entirely different brand o f
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representation on major policy questions” (Fiorina 1973, 490). In the second case study, 
electoral turnover produces a change o f over 60 percent in Conservative Coalition scores 
with a 50 percent change in support for a larger federal role. Fiorina uses this data to 
claim that intense electoral competition does not produce moderating legislators, but 
instead produces “ flip-flopping” representation, from the liberal extreme to the 
conservative extreme.
Shapiro, Brady, Brody, and Ferejohn (1990) devise a modified two-constituencies 
hypothesis. They assert that the preferences o f party identifiers and independents will 
effect senatorial voting records Own party preferences have the strongest influence on 
voting records; however, depending on the number o f independent voters, they will also 
have an effect (Shapiro et al 1990) In addition, the ideological preferences o f 
independents are approximately those o f the median voter, which implies that they have a 
moderating effect Unlike Fiorina (1973), Shapiro et al (1990) allow for the influences o f 
independent voters, but still accept the premise that legislators are primarily motivated by 
party identifiers.
End-of-term Responsiveness
Ahuja’s (1994) analysis does not predict the direction o f ideological shifting He 
uses data from the American National Election Studies to develop mean constituency 
preferences and Conservative Coalition opposition scores to measure senatorial roll-call 
behavior. Ahuja’s hypothesis is that senators become more responsive to their 
constituencies at election time, regardless o f the direction o f their end-of-term shifting.
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The results suggest that senators who are running for reelection have mean ideological 
scores that are closer to constituency preferences than senators who are two and four 
years away from reelection. In addition, those senators who are two years away are 
closer to constituency preferences than senators four years away from reelection. These 
data lead Ahuja to conclude that senators become more responsive during the election 
season.
Amacher and Boyes (1978) investigate the proposition that as elections approach 
senators will display less “ independent” voting records. They use Conservative Coalition 
scores to measure the ideological positions o f senators. To estimate constituency 
preferences, they average the Conservative Coalition scores o f House members in a 
particular senator’s state Results indicate there are no significant differences between 
senators who are 3-4 and 5-6 years away from reelection However, senators who are 1-2 
years away from reelection are more responsive to constituency preferences than either 
the 3-4 year group or the 5-6 year group. They conclude that more frequent elections will 
produce a more responsive legislature.
This discussion o f the literature illustrates that there are no definitive answers to 
the moderation hypothesis. Elling (1982) and Wright and Berkman (1986) find support 
for the moderation hypothesis; however, their results are inconclusive. Wright and 
Berkman (1986) only investigate one election, which limits the generalizability o f their 
results. Moreover, Elling (1982) includes senators who were not seeking reelection, 
which means that they have no incentive to moderate. Bernstein (1991) and Thomas 
(1985) find results that seem to support the moderation hypothesis. However, they
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conclude that senators are not moderating, but instead are moving toward the ideological 
positions o f their likely opponents, which may or may not be the same thing. Fiorina 
(1973) suggests that senators are only attentive to their party identifiers, while Shapiro et 
al. (1990) find that independent voters are also influential Finally, Amacher and Boyes 
(1978) and Ahuja (1994) find that senators become more responsive to their 
constituencies, regardless o f the direction o f their end o f term shifting. There is evidence 
both supporting and contradicting the median voter theorem. Therefore, there are 
compelling reasons to investigate the issue further.
Theory and Hypotheses
Earlier studies have relied on summary scores o f ideology to measure moderation. 
These measures collapse discrete policy areas into one indicator, which does not offer 
sufficient resolution to adequately test the median voter theorem. I believe that senators 
may have reasons to moderate more in one policy area than in another, which is why I test 
the moderation hypothesis by employing multiple indicators in discrete policy areas. This 
allows me to clarify some o f the inconsistencies o f previous research through developing 
more specific hypotheses than have been previously tested.
The first hypothesis is in the area o f economic policy. Jacobson (1997) suggests 
that economic conditions do influence the motivations o f candidates. Particularly, when 
economic conditions are perceived to be poor, more qualified challengers from the 
opposition party will run (124-128). Shapiro et al. (1990) report that the preferences o f 
independent voters have their largest effect on senatorial voting in the area o f economic
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policy. Therefore, I predict that incumbents will moderate to alleviate the economic 
concerns o f independent voters, which are the functional equivalent o f the concerns o f the 
median voter (Shapiro et al. 1990).
This explains the need for incumbents to moderate on economic policy, but should 
there be differences in moderation between the parties? This aspect o f economic policy 
has not been thoroughly addressed in the literature However, one study provides some 
guidance on this question Fiorina (1996) cites data from the 1984 American National 
Election Study (ANES) which lists voter policy positions in relation to their perceptions 
o f party positions. On the two issues concerning economic policy, Democrats were twice 
as far as Republicans from the mean position o f voters Clearly there is great incentive for 
Democrats to moderate on economic policy since they are perceived to be much farther 
from the median voter than are Republicans. Because they are perceived to be farther 
from constituency preferences, I predict that a larger percentage o f Democratic senators 
will moderate than Republican senators on economic policy.
In the area o f social policy, Tatalovich and Daynes (1988) claim that because o f 
the single-issue groups involved in social policy, legislative leeway is denied to politicians 
who desire to resolve moral or social issues through compromise and moderation. Social 
issues are often seen in terms o f black and white or right and wrong, these “ electoral 
pressures encourage Congress to represent traditional values in social regulatory policy” 
(Tatalovich and Daynes 1988, 218) However, they further observe that Republican party 
identifiers and the general electorate hold similar preferences on social policy (1988, 215). 
Thus, Republicans do not have as much incentive to moderate on social policy, because
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they are already quite likely to be positioned near the median voter. Also, because o f their 
association with conservative single-issue groups, their ability to moderate may be 
constrained. As a result, a majority o f Democrats should moderate on social policy, while 
only a small percentage o f Republicans w ill moderate.
It is more difficult to make specific predictions in the area o f foreign policy. In 
general, there is the commonly held belief that the American public is less interested in 
foreign policy than domestic policy because it is removed from their everyday experiences. 
Also, their policy preferences in this area are less firmly held than those on domestic issues 
(Erikson, Luttbeg, and Tedin 1988) Because o f this, senators may be allowed quite a bit 
o f leeway on foreign policy votes (Fenno 1978). However, Fenno (1996) also suggests 
that senators are very cognizant o f their foreign policy votes at election time. Along these 
lines, Shapiro et al (1990) find that foreign policy preferences o f party identifiers have an 
influence on voting records and the preferences o f independents have a small but 
significant effect In addition, 1984 ANES data on defense spending show that 
Republicans are nearly twice as far from constituency preferences as Democrats, who are 
only eight-tenths o f a point away from mean constituency preferences on a seven point 
scale. These studies indicate that Democrats have little need to moderate in foreign 
policy For Republicans, this issue is more complicated. Because o f the influence o f party 
preferences and the relatively weak influence o f independent voters (Shapiro et al. 1990),
I expect less than a majority to moderate. However, since Republicans are further from 
constituency preferences, I believe that a larger percentage o f Republicans w ill moderate 
on foreign policy than Democrats.
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In sum, the hypotheses I test are:
Hypothesis 1: Both groups o f senators will moderate on economic policy, but a larger 
percentage o f Democrats will moderate than Republicans.
Hypothesis 2: A majority o f Democratic senators w ill moderate on social policy, but 
only a small percentage o f Republicans will moderate.
Hypothesis 3: Less than a majority o f both groups o f senators will moderate on
foreign policy, but a larger percentage o f Republicans will moderate than 
Democrats.
I refine the moderation hypothesis to test it by discrete policy areas. All o f the 
previous studies test this hypothesis through the use o f summary measures Such scores 
collapse several policy areas into one overarching measure o f ideology, which may mute 
the different positions a senator may take in separate policy areas. I believe my approach 
will offer the resolution necessary to clarify the findings in the extant literature that may 
have been confounded by inadequate measures o f roll call voting. By testing the 
moderation hypothesis across discrete policy areas, I w ill be able to detect movement on 
the ideological spectrum that would have been missed in previous research designs. 





How to measure roll-call voting has been a perplexing problem for scholars. This 
fact has contributed significantly to the controversy over whether moderation occurs. The 
measures used in earlier studies are limited in their ability to accurately assess variability in 
roll-call votes because previous researchers have relied on subjective ideological measures 
compiled by interest groups, survey data, or on measures that emphasize divisive votes 
(Ahuja 1994; Amacher and Boyes 1978, Bernstein 1991, Elling 1982, Thomas 1985; 
Wright and Berkman 1986)
Interest group measures are developed in a biased manner. These groups select a 
relatively small number o f votes according to the particular group’s policy interests, then 
publish a list o f how members o f Congress voted and indicate what the group thought was 
correct (Poole 1981). Some groups record absences as an “ incorrect”  vote because their 
policy preferences were not supported Rating a member o f Congress in this manner only 
provides information on whether a legislator supports a particular group’s policy goals 
(Snyder 1992) Because o f this subjectivity, interest group scores are inadequate 
measures for an objective investigation.
As a result o f interest groups targeting certain issues, their scores are based on 
polarized issues and many votes are not even considered. These ratings tend to assign 
extreme scores to a large fraction o f members and moderate scores to relatively few 
members, which produces bimodal distributions (Snyder 1992). Interest groups choose 
votes that are highly divisive and easily classify members o f Congress as conservative or
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liberal along the issue dimension o f their particular interest (when in fact many are 
moderate) Thus, the ratings make the legislature appear more polarized than it actually is 
(Snyder 1992). Another criticism raised by Snyder (1992) is that comparisons o f scores 
cannot be made over time. Interest groups use different issues each year to rate members 
o f Congress. Rarely, i f  ever, are the ratings based on the same issues. A member o f 
Congress may have an ADA score o f 90 in one Congress, then a score o f 75 in the next.
In the latter year, the member appears to be more moderate than previously; however, an 
actual ideological change may not have occurred Snyder (1992) suggests that 
recalculating scores after weighting roll calls to approximate a uniform distribution or 
using scaling techniques would improve these measures.
Fowler (1982) discusses similar criticisms about interest group measures, but also 
offers others. She claims that i f  used as the dependent variable, only the accuracy o f the 
prediction is affected, but i f  used as the independent variable, both parameters will be 
influenced She also found that interest groups were surprised that academia had used 
their scores .. Each o f the staff members interviewed expressed considerable surprise 
and some skepticism at the use to which scholars put their ratings, and none o f them 
attributed much influence to the scores among the general public” (Fowler 1982, 403) In 
addition, interest group scores do not differentiate between policy areas and tend to 
emphasize economic interests (Fowler 1982) These ratings are also influenced by 
congressional requests In one instance, a measure was revised to give a senator a more 
favorable rating (Fowler 1982) Both Fowler (1982) and Snyder (1992) provide evidence 
which suggests that many problems may arise when attempting to use interest group
15
scores as an objective measure.
Scholars frequently use interest group measures because o f their availability and 
the precedent set by previous researchers. In an effort to avoid the problems o f interest 
group measures, some researchers have used survey data to estimate ideology, but this is 
extremely costly. Wright and Berkman (1986) use survey data with an exceptionally large 
sample in their study and find impressive results Even though their sample includes over 
35,000 respondents, it is taken at one time point. As a result, they have identified much 
information about the 1982 election, but their results may not be generalizable.
In addition, through the use o f congressional surveys, Wright and Berkman (1986) 
only identify self-reported policy positions, which are not measures o f voting behavior 
Self-reported policy positions may vary more than actual roll-call votes. Answering a 
hypothetical question or identifying a particular position may be easier to do in the 
abstract, than it is to place a recorded vote Furthermore, a senator can frame an answer 
about a salient issue in the best possible light, whereas, a roll-call vote may not allow a 
senator such leeway. I want to use a quantifiable measure o f overt behavior, not a 
possible future policy position which allows a member o f Congress to appeal to their 
constituency without actually having to do anything.
Even more importantly, the measures used in previous studies do not differentiate 
between policy areas Expecting to accurately measure voting variability and/or 
ideological shifting through the use o f an indicator that does not distinguish between 
policy areas is theoretically unsound The process o f representation in the areas o f 
economic, social, and foreign policies may be quite different. A  vote on economic policy
16
will involve different considerations than a vote on social or foreign policy. As a result, a 
senator’s record on economic policy may become more moderate, whereas a vote on 
social policy may become more extreme. Thus, these scores are moving in opposite 
directions. I f  not measured separately, there may appear to be little or no movement on 
the ideological spectrum. An indicator that does not collapse these two areas into one 
score will provide a more accurate picture. Instead o f identifying a lack of, or a small 
ideological shift, a measure that differentiates between policy areas is more likely to 
identify a substantial shift in any given policy area.
To answer my research question, I need a score that measures senatorial action, 
not reported policy positions. A  useful measure o f roll call voting should also differentiate 
between policy areas. In addition, a satisfactory measure must adequately address the 
concerns outlined above by Fowler (1982) and Snyder (1992). The National Journal 
ratings, which have never been used to identify ideological shifting, meet all o f these 
requirements.
The National Journal is a magazine o f public policy. Its targeted audiences are 
lawyers, lobbyists, elected officials and bureaucrats. In 1981, the National Journal, in 
conjunction with The Baron Report, developed their ratings in an attempt to establish an 
objective method o f analyzing congressional voting patterns. National Journal ratings
attempt to avoid the value judgments o f interest group rating systems (National Journal 
1982). To illustrate the usefulness o f these scores, I describe how the ratings were 
developed for 1994.
A panel o f National Journal editors and reporters initially compiled a list o f 52 roll
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call votes for the Senate and classified them as either economic, social, or foreign policy 
votes (National Journal 1995, p. 86). The computerized roll call data was provided by 
Garrison Nelson, University o f Vermont, while statistical analysis and data processing 
were conducted by the Social Science Computation Center o f the Brookings Institution.1 
The "yea" and "nay" votes were correlated and identified as liberal or conservative. Based 
on the degree to which these votes correlated with other votes in a particular issue area, 
they were assigned a weight o f 1 (lowest) to 3 (highest). A higher-weighted score 
indicates a stronger correlation, which identifies a better example o f a vote on economic, 
social, or foreign policy (National Journal 1995). For a complete list o f these policy 
votes, see the Appendix
The weighted votes from each issue area were combined to develop an index o f 
liberal votes as a percentage o f total votes. Voting records were then matched to the 
index, while absences and abstentions were omitted. I f  a member missed more than half 
the votes in any issue area, a score o f "missing" was given and a percentile was not 
calculated in these instances. Members were then ranked from most liberal to most 
conservative. These rankings were used to develop liberal and conservative percentiles. 
Each member is given a liberal and conservative percentile score for each issue area. A 
liberal percentile score o f 70 means a senator voted the liberal position more often than 70 
percent o f the members.
National Journal ratings overcome the shortcomings that have been cited for 
interest group ratings (Fowler 1982, Snyder 1992). Following the suggestion o f Snyder
1 Votes were subjected to principal components analysis which dropped four votes that were unrelated to 
the others, which typically reflected regional and special interest rather than general ideology.
18
(1992), weighted roll calls and scaling techniques have been employed by the National 
Journal These techniques provide a more accurate picture o f roll call voting in Congress 
and a score that is comparable over time. National Journal scores also address the 
concerns o f Fowler (1982). They are objective measures that were designed to analyze 
congressional voting in discrete policy areas. Because o f these desirable properties, I 
believe that the National Journal scores provide a solid foundation from which to 
generalize about shifts in the voting behavior o f U. S. Senators.
Method
I investigate the behavior o f senators from four “ classes.”  A  “ class”  is defined as 
any set o f senators that were elected or reelected in a given year, served a full term, have 
relatively complete voting records, and sought reelection. Each o f the four “ classes”  o f 
senators are divided by party and coded: elected in 1982 = class 1 (n=26), elected in 1984 
= class 2 (n=26), elected in 1986 = class 3 (n=27), and elected in 1988 = class 4 (n=21).
A  senator elected in 1982 could also be included in the class o f 1988; otherwise a senator 
belongs only to one class.
The measure o f my dependent variable, the National Journal rankings, is reported 
in the form o f liberal and conservative percentiles. For easier use, these scores are 
converted into the standard scale o f 0-100 by subtracting the conservative percentile from 
100, adding it to the liberal percentile score and dividing by two. 2 Table 1 (below) has an
2 For example: In 1992 Phil Gramm (R-Texas) had a conservative percentile score of 89 in social policy 
and a liberal percentile score o f 0. To convert into a liberalism scale of 0-100 take 100 - 89(conservative 
percentile)= 11 + 0(liberal percentile) and divide by 2 = 5.5. Ted Kennedy (D-Mass.) had a conservative 
percentile score of 0 in social policy and a liberal percentile score o f 89. The conversion: 100 - 0 = 100; 
100 + 89= 189; 189/2 = 94.5. On the scale 0 equals absolutely conservative and 100 equals absolutely 
liberal. In social policy Gramm has a 5.5 and Kennedy has a 94.5.
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Table 1
Standardized National Journal Ratings
Year Name Liberal % Conservative % Standardized


















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































example o f the liberal and conservative percentiles in each policy area and their conversion 
into the standardized scores.
I compare the averages o f senatorial voting scores, which are my dependent 
variables, for the first four years with the averages o f the last two years o f individual 
senatorial terms. I expect voting behavior to vary over time. Therefore, my independent 
variables are, in effect, the years o f a senator’s term. Since the level o f analysis is the 
individual, I am able to identify every senator who moderates by policy area and the extent 
to which they moderate. I f  the mean scores o f the first four years are more extreme than 
the last two years, this indicates that moderation has occurred. End-of-term moderation is 
defined as movement toward the mid-point o f the National Journal scale. 3 In order to 
generalize about moderation, the number o f senators who moderate and by how much are 
reported by class and as an aggregate o f the four classes.
In addition, I compare the percentages o f moderating senators with the 
percentages o f senators whose voting records do not change as elections approach and 
those whose records become more extreme It is important to identify the behavior o f 
moderating, as well as non-moderating senators to understand end-of-term shifting.
Finding that 50 percent o f one class o f senators have voting records that become less 
extreme at the end o f their terms may be an indication that moderation is occurring. 
However, i f  the other 50 percent o f senators become more extreme at the end o f their 
terms, the evidence o f moderation is not conclusive. Comparing these percentages is how
3 The mid-point o f the National Journal scale (50) is the median o f senatorial voting records. Since I do 
not utilize constituency data, this mid-point represents an approximation o f the median o f constituency 
preferences (see E lling 1982; Thomas 1985).
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I w ill be able to determine i f  senators are, in fact, moderating. I also include a test o f 
significance between two proportions for each policy area. This allows me to determine i f  
there are actual differences in the degree o f moderation between Republicans and 
Democrats.
Previous studies have considered a moderating shift as any movement on the 
ideological spectrum toward the median voter. A movement o f only one point is even 
classified as a shift (Ahuja 1994, Amacher and Boyes 1978, Bernstein 1991, Elling 1982, 
Thomas 1985; Wright and Berkman 1986). In order for movement to be considered a 
shift in my study it must be at least five points Movement o f less than that could easily be 
the result o f chance or measurement error. Since the intent is to identify intentional 
movement, the five-point criterion is well suited to the goals o f this analysis.
I also use a more accurate measure o f roll-call voting than has been previously 
used (Ahuja 1994, Amacher and Boyes 1978, Bernstein 1991, Elling 1982; Thomas 1985, 
Wright and Berkman 1986). National Journal scores differentiate between policy areas, 
providing a more resolute test o f my research question: do senatorial voting records 
become more moderate as reelection approaches? By using a more refined measure and 





In this chapter, I report the findings o f my research. First, I examine the 
percentages o f moderating senators and report the results o f the tests o f significance 
between the proportions o f moderating senators from each party. Then, I compare the 
percentages o f moderating senators with non-moderating senators to determine which 
groups are moderating, which are remaining consistent, and which are becoming more 
extreme. This allows me discern whether reelection moderation is meaningful. Each 
section begins with the aggregate results for the four classes for each policy area. After 
determining whether there is support for my hypotheses for that policy area at the 
aggregate level, I analyze the results by class I include the results at the aggregate level 
for control. It provides a group with a large sample size and helps to eliminate any 
anomalies that may occur during a particular election cycle, which may confound my 
results.
Economic Policy
My first hypothesis posits that both groups o f senators w ill moderate on economic 
policy, but a larger percentage o f Democrats (since they are perceived to be farther from 
constituency preferences) w ill moderate than Republicans. The aggregate o f the four 
classes (see Table 2 below) reveals that a majority, 55 percent, o f Democratic senators 
moderate on economic policy. The mean shift toward moderation for these senators is 
13.8 points In other words, these results show that a majority o f Democrats were, on
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average, nearly 14 points more moderate on economic policy during the last two years o f 
their terms than in the first four. For Democrats, in the area o f economic policy, a 
majority o f senatorial voting records become more moderate as reelection approaches. 
The results for Republicans are less conclusive. On average, 32 percent o f 
Republican senators are more moderate at the end o f their terms than at the beginning on 
economic policy. The mean shift toward moderation for these senators is 9 8 points. 
Fewer Republicans Moderate than Democrats, but one-third do appear to be engaging in 
reelection moderation on economic policy.
Table 2
Senators Who Moderate on Economic Policy
Economic Policy A g g re g a te C la s s  1 C la s s  2 C la s s  3 C la s s  4
1983-1994 1983-1988 1988-1990 1987-1992 1989-1994
DEMOCRATS 55% 60% 50% 59% 50%
Mean Shifts o f Moderation 13.8 12.8 17.7 12.2 14.1
REPUBLICANS 32% 36% 43% 20% 22%
Mean Shifts o f Moderation 9.8 12.3 8.8 7.4 10.5
These results remain consistent when analyzed by class. At least 50 percent o f 
Democratic senators from each class moderate their voting records. In fact, 60 percent o f 
the Democratic senators in class I become more moderate as elections approach, by a 
mean shift o f nearly 13 points. The mean shifts toward moderation for each class o f 
Democratic senators range from 12 2 points in class 3 to 17 7 points in class 2. The large 
percentages o f moderating Democratic senators suggest that they may be quite far from 
median constituency preferences during the first four years o f their terms.
In none o f the four classes do a majority o f Republican senators moderate on 
economic policy. The highest percentage o f Republicans who moderate is in class 2 with
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43 percent, while only 20 percent moderate in class 3. The range o f mean shifts toward 
moderation for Republicans on economic policy are 7.4 to 12.3 points. These findings 
imply that at election time a majority o f Republicans may already be positioned quite near 
median constituency preferences on economic policy.
Social Policy
The hypothesis on social policy states that a majority o f Democratic senators will 
moderate, but only a small percentage o f Republican senators will moderate. The 
aggregate o f the four classes (see Table 3 below) shows that 57 percent o f Democratic 
senators moderate on social policy. The mean shift among these senators toward 
moderation is 11.8 points. In short, these data indicate that more than a majority o f 
Democratic senators are, on average, almost twelve points more moderate during the last 
two years o f their terms than in the first four years. It appears that Democrats moderate 
on social, as well as, economic policy as reelection approaches.
Aggregate level results on social policy reveal that few Republican senators 
moderate as reelection approaches Only 16 percent moderate on social policy, with a 
mean shift among those who moderate o f 8.4 points. As reelection approaches, only a 
small percentage o f Republicans become more moderate. These findings suggest their 
closeness to median constituency preferences and their ties to single issue groups 




Senators Who Moderate on Social Policy
Social Policy A g g re g a te C la s s  1 C la s s  2 C la s s  3 C la s s  4
1983-1994 1983-1988 1985-1990 1987-1992 1989-1994
DEMOCRATS 57% 53% 58% 59% 58%
Mean Shifts o f Moderation 11.8 12 12.7 9.6 13.7
REPUBLICANS 16% 18% 14% 30% 0
Mean Shifts o f Moderation 8.4 9.1 6.4 9.3 0
The analysis by class yields similar results. In each class, at least 53 percent o f 
Democratic senators moderate, with the largest percent (59 percent) moderating in class 
3 The mean shifts toward moderation range from 9.6 points in class 3 to 13.7 points in 
class 4. The percentages o f senators moderating and the magnitude o f their shifts indicate 
that the policy positions o f most Democratic senators, during the first four years o f their 
terms, may not be consistent with the policy preferences o f the median voter This may be 
why so many o f them moderate their voting records as reelection approaches.
In none o f the four classes do a majority o f Republican senators moderate. In fact, 
in class 4, no Republicans moderate Class 3 has the largest percentage o f Republicans 
that moderate with 30 percent The range o f mean shifts toward moderation among 
Republicans on social policy is 6.4 to 9.3 points. As reelection approaches, it appears that 
very few Republicans moderate their voting records on social policy. Among those who 
do, the moderating shifts are relatively small.
Foreign Policy
My hypothesis on foreign policy posits that less than a majority o f both groups o f
senators will moderate, but a larger percentage o f Republicans will moderate than
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Democrats. The aggregate level results o f the four classes (see Table 4 below) indicate 
that 46 percent o f Democratic senators moderate on foreign policy. It is in the area o f 
foreign policy that the smallest percentage o f Democratic senators moderate as reelection 
approaches. Moreover, Democrats have their smallest aggregate mean shift toward 
moderation in this policy area at 10.9 points.
In the aggregate, 36 percent o f Republican Senators moderate on foreign policy. 
The mean shift among those who moderate is 11.3 points. Again, as in the previous two 
policy areas, fewer Republicans than Democrats are moderating as reelection approaches. 
However, at the aggregate level, more Republican senators moderate on foreign policy 
than in any other area. This is also the only policy area where Republicans have a larger 
mean shift than Democrats.
Table 4
Senators Who Moderate on Foreign Policy
Foreign Policy Aggregate Class 1 Class 2 Class 3 Class 4
1983-1994 1983-1988 1985-1990 1987-1992 1989-1994
DEMOCRATS 46% 33% 25% 65% 58%
Mean Shifts of Moderation 10.9 13.6 6.8 10.9 10.9
REPUBLICANS 36% 18% 36% 60% 33%
Mean Shifts o f Moderation 11.3 8.4 12.6 10.5 12.6
When foreign policy is analyzed by class, more variation is present than in the 
areas o f economic and social policy. Sixty-five percent o f Democratic senators moderate 
in class 3 This is the largest percentage o f moderating senators in any o f the classes for 
all three policy areas. However, only 25 percent moderate in class 2, which is the lowest 
percentage o f Democrats in any policy area. The mean shifts toward moderation for 
Democrats range from 6.79 points in class 2 to 13.6 points in class 1. One possible
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explanation for the disparity may be the hostilities in the Persian Gulf, which started at the 
end o f the terms for senators in class 3. This was a highly salient issue. The electorate 
became more attentive to foreign policy issues and encouraged bipartisan efforts in the 
Senate, which resulted in more moderate voting records on both sides o f the aisle.
There are also variations present when looking at the individual classes of 
Republican senators. Based on the aggregate level analysis, foreign policy is the area in 
which the largest percentage o f Republicans moderate. However, this higher percentage 
o f moderating Republican senators can be attributed to the anomaly o f class 3, in which 
60 percent o f Republican senators moderate. The other three classes have moderation 
percentages that are very similar to the previous findings for economic and social policy.
These data indicate that a larger percentage o f Democrats moderate than do their 
Republican counterparts on economic and social policy. Less than a majority o f 
Republicans are moderating on economic policy, while only a small percentage moderate 
in social policy. In addition, less than a majority o f both groups moderate on foreign 
policy as expected, but a larger percentage o f Democrats moderate than Republicans. 
These findings provide solid support for my second hypothesis, but suggest that 
hypotheses 1 and 3 need further refinement.
The problem with relying solely on these findings is that there is no control for the 
differences in class sizes between the two parties. For example, in class 4 there are 12 
Democrats and 9 Republicans. On economic policy, I expected a larger percentage o f 
Democrats to moderate than Republicans. The results for class 4 seem to support my 
hypothesis, as 50 percent o f Democrats and 22 percent o f Republicans moderate.
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However, i f  there had been a larger number o f Republicans, would a greater percentage
have moderated? Without a test o f significance, I cannot discern i f  the differing 
percentages o f moderating senators between the two parties are actually different. I 
employ a z-test o f significance between proportions o f moderating senators from each 
party to test my three hypotheses (see Table 5 below).
Table 5










Economic 2.34*** 1.2 0.36 1.97** 1.3*
Social 4.12*** 1.82** 2.35*** 1.44* 2.82***
Foreign 0.64 0.86 -0.59 0.24 1.14
*  Alpha level _ < .01; * *  Alpha level < =  .05; * Alpha level <= .1
The hypothesis on economic policy posits that a larger percentage o f Democratic 
senators will moderate than Republican senators. At the aggregate level, the difference 
between the percentage o f moderating Democrats and Republicans is statistically 
significant at alpha <= .01. When analyzed by class, the results are less conclusive. For 
classes 1 and 2, the difference between the percentages o f moderating senators is not 
statistically significant, which may be a result o f a small number o f moderating 
Republicans. However, the results for classes 3 and 4 are statistically significant at alpha 
≤ .05 and alpha ≤ .1, respectively Although the results for two o f the classes are not 
significant, the evidence indicates that over the time period being tested (1983-1994), a 
larger percentage o f Democratic senators moderate than Republican senators on economic 
policy.
The expectation on social policy is that a majority o f Democratic senators will
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Z-Test o f Significance between Proportions o f Moderating Senators from  Each Party
moderate, while only a small percentage o f Republican senators will moderate. The 
results at the aggregate level are statistically significant at alpha ≤ 0 .1. In addition, the 
differences between the percentages o f moderating senators is significant in each o f the 
four classes (alpha levels for class 1 ≤ .05; class 3 ≤ .1; classes 2 and 4 ≤ .01). These 
findings indicate that from 1983 to 1994, a majority o f Democratic senators moderate on 
social policy, but only a small percentage o f their Republican counterparts moderate.
The hypothesis on foreign policy states that a larger percentage o f Republican 
senators will moderate than Democratic senators. The initial findings do not support this 
expectation. Although the reported percentages indicate that a larger percentage o f 
Democrats moderate than Republicans, this difference is not statistically significant. In 
fact, at the aggregate level, as well as for each individual class, none o f the differences in 
percentages o f moderating senators are statistically significant.
In summation, there is some support for the first two hypotheses. A larger 
percentage o f Democratic senators, when compared to their Republican counterparts, do 
in fact moderate on economic and social policy. However, fewer Republicans moderate 
on economic policy than expected. On social policy only a small percentage of 
Republicans moderate, which is consistent with my expectations. The expectation in the 
third hypothesis, that less than a majority o f senators would moderate, is supported. 
However, contrary to expectations, Democrats and Republicans moderate at roughly 
equal percentages on foreign policy.
Still, there remains an unanswered question. Which groups o f senators are 
actually moderating? The percentages o f senators displaying reelection moderation has
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been reported. In addition, the differing percentages o f moderation between parties has 
been tested. However, it is easy to show that a larger percentage o f Democrats moderate 
than Republicans i f  the former moderates and the latter does not. To fully answer the 
moderation question requires comparing the percentages o f moderating senators, with 
those whose voting records remain consistent (no end-of-term shift, or one o f less than 5 
points), and those whose voting records become more extreme. I f  50 percent o f senators 
moderate their voting records, it would appear that reelection moderation is occurring. 
However, i f  the other 50 percent become more extreme, the evidence is less conclusive. 
But, i f  50 percent moderate, 30 percent remain consistent, and 20 percent become more 
extreme, then there is solid evidence o f reelection moderation. Comparing these 
percentages allows me to discern i f  reelection moderation is actually occurring.
Economic Policy Moderate Same Extreme
Democrats (56) 55% 20% 25%
Class 1 (15) 60% 27% 13%
Class 2 (12) 50% 25% 25%
Class 3 (17) 59% 6% 35%
Class 4 (12) 50% 25% 25%
On economic policy (see table 6 above), comparing the percentages o f moderating 
and non-moderating senators shows that Democratic senatorial voting records typically 
become more moderate as reelection approaches. At the aggregate level, as well as for 
each individual class, the predominant end-of-term voting behavior o f Democratic 
senators who are seeking reelection is to become more moderate during the last two years 
o f their terms. For all o f the classes except class 3, Democratic senators who moderate
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Table 6
End-of-Term Voting Behavior o f Democrats on Economic Policy
do so at a ratio o f 2:1 or greater when compared to those whose voting records stay the 
same and those whose records become more extreme. Even in class 3, more senators 
moderate than become more extreme or stay the same. This clearly indicates that between 
1983 and 1994, Democratic senators moderate on economic policy at the end o f their 
terms.
Comparing the percentages o f moderating and non-moderating Republican 
senators on economic policy (see Table 7 below) indicates that they behave differently at 
the end o f their terms than Democrats. At the aggregate level, a larger percentage o f 
Republican senatorial voting records remain consistent (45 percent) as reelection 
approaches than become more extreme (23 percent) or more moderate (32 percent).
Equal percentages o f Republican voting records become moderate and remain consistent 
in classes 1 (36 percent) and 2 (43 percent). In addition, the same percentage (40 
percent) o f voting records become more extreme and remain consistent in class 3. In class 
4, an overwhelming majority (67 percent) o f Republican voting records remain unchanged 
during the last two years o f their terms, when compared with the first four years. Also in 
class 4, only 22 percent moderate and just 11 percent become more extreme. The data 
indicate that Republican senatorial voting records tend to remain consistent throughout 
their terms on economic policy.
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Table 7
End-of- Term Voting Behavior o f Republicans on Economic Policy
Economic Policy Moderate Same Extreme
Republicans (44) 32% 45% 23%
Class 1 (11) 36% 36% 27%
Class 2 (14) 43% 43% 14%
Class 3 (10) 20% 40% 40%
Class 4 (9) 22% 67% 11%
For Democrats on social policy, as on economic policy, the predominant end-of- 
term voting behavior is to become more moderate than they had been during the first four 
years o f their terms (see Table 8 below). Even fewer Democrats become more extreme as 
reelection approaches (18 percent) on social policy than on economic policy (25 percent). 
At the aggregate level and for each individual class, a majority o f senators moderate. 
Clearly, Democratic senators are engaging in reelection moderation on social and 
economic policy.
Table 8
End-of-Term Voting Behavior o f Democrats on Social Policy
Social Policy Moderate Same Extreme
Democrats (56) 57% 25% 18%
Class 1 (15) 53% 27% 20%
Class 2 (12) 58% 25% 17%
Class 3 (17) 59% 18% 24%
Class 4 (12) 58% 33% 8%
Comparing the percentages o f moderating and non-moderating Republican 
senators on social policy reveals that they behave differently at the end o f their terms than 
Democrats (see Table 9 below). Only in class 3 does the percentage o f moderating 
senators (30 percent) equal the percentage o f those whose voting records become more
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extreme. In every other class, the percentages o f voting records that remain consistent as 
reelection approaches and those records that become more extreme exceeds the 
percentage o f senators who moderate at the end o f their terms. Again, a larger 
percentage o f Republican senatorial voting records remain consistent at the end o f their 
terms (45 percent) than those that moderate (16 percent) or become more extreme (39 
percent). However, a larger percentage o f Republicans become more extreme at the end 
o f their terms on social policy (39 percent) than on economic policy (23 percent).
Table 9
End-of-Term Voting Behavior o f Republicans on Social Policy
Social Policy Moderate Same Extreme
Republicans (44) 16% 45% 39%
Class 1 (11) 18% 45% 36%
Class 2 (14) 14% 43% 43%
Class 3 (10) 30% 40% 30%
Class 4 (9) 0 56% 44%
At the aggregate level on foreign policy (see Table 10 below), more Democrats 
moderate (43 percent) than remain consistent (36 percent), or become more extreme (21 
percent) at the end o f their terms Although a larger percentage o f senators moderate 
than any other end-of-term behavior, not as many are moderating when compared to the 
percentages that moderate on economic and social policy. In classes 3 and 4, the results 
are consistent with the findings in other policy areas. A  larger percentage o f senators 
moderate than become extreme or remain the same. In classes 1 (40 percent) and 2 (42 
percent), a larger percentage o f senators have consistent, rather than moderating or more 
extreme, voting records as reelection approaches. On foreign policy, Democrats display 
two patterns. In the earlier classes their voting records tend to remain consistent and in
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the later classes, Democrats tend to shift toward moderation.
Table 10
End-of-Term Voting Behavior o f Democrats on Foreign Policy
Foreign Policy Moderate Same Extreme
Democrats (56) 43% 36% 21%
Class 1 (15) 33% 40% 27%
Class 2 (12) 25% 42% 33%
Class 3 (17) 53% 24% 24%
Class 4 (12) 58% 42% 0
A comparison o f the percentages o f moderating and non-moderating Republican 
senators on foreign policy (see Table 11 below) indicates a decisive trend. Except for the 
anomaly o f class 3, more than 50 percent o f Republican senators in each class remain 
consistent at the end o f their terms. Although a larger percentage o f senators moderate 
than become more extreme on foreign policy, typically, Republicans are characterized by 
an absence o f end-of-term shifting.
Table 11
Foreign Policy Moderate Same Extreme
Republicans (44) 36% 50% 14%
Class 1 (11) 18% 64% 18%
Class 2 (14) 36% 50% 14%
Class 3 (10) 60% 30% 10%
Class 4 (9) 33% 56% 11%
By comparing the percentages o f senators who moderate, who remain consistent, 
and who become more extreme, a clearer picture o f end-of-term voting behavior is 
developed. On economic and social policy a majority o f Democrats tend to engage in 
reelection moderation. On foreign policy there are two discernable patterns. The first
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End-of-Term Voting Behavior o f Republicans on Foreign Policy
two classes o f Democrats tend to remain consistent, while the last two classes tend to
moderate as reelection approaches. Republican voting records, on the other hand, tend to 
remain consistent in all three policy areas. However, a larger percentage o f Republicans 
moderate on economic policy than become extreme, while a larger percentage become 
more extreme than moderate on social policy. In fact, very few moderate on social policy. 
On foreign policy, the majority o f Republicans remain consistent at the end o f their terms.
In summation, a greater percentage o f Democrats moderate than Republicans on 
economic and social policy, while both moderate with about the same frequency on 
foreign policy. However, reelection moderation is not practiced equally by both parties. 
Over the time period under investigation (1983-1994), Democrats appear to be 
moderating as reelection approaches on economic and social policy, but in only the last 
two classes on foreign policy. On the other hand, the majority o f Republicans do not 
appear to be moderating in any policy area. Their voting records tend to remain 




This chapter begins with a review my research question and three hypotheses. 
Then, I explain why the National Journal ratings are uniquely suited as a measure o f roll 
call voting for this thesis and describe the method used to investigate the moderation 
hypothesis I also summarize my findings and discuss their importance. In addition, I 
explore the normative implications o f my research. In conclusion, I discuss the directions 
that future research should take.
In this thesis, I investigate whether senators moderate their voting records as 
reelection approaches. This question is explored by developing a theoretical orientation 
based on Downs’ An Economic Theory to Democracy (1957). The median voter theorem 
states that the optimal electoral strategy is to appeal to the preferences o f the median 
voter which, in effect, results in end-of-term moderation. I refine the moderation 
hypothesis to be specific to particular policy areas. This allows me to answer my research 
question across discrete policy areas, instead o f in terms o f general ideology. I believe 
that this results in a clearer understanding o f moderation in the U S. Senate.
My hypothesis on economic policy is that senators from both parties will 
moderate, but a larger percentage o f Democrats will moderate than Republicans. Both 
groups will moderate to appeal to the preferences o f the median voter. However, since 
Democrats are perceived to be further from constituency preferences, the expectation is 
that more Democrats will moderate than Republicans. On social policy, a majority o f 
Democrats are expected to moderate, but only a small percentage o f Republicans are
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expected to display end-of-term moderation. A majority o f Democrats are expected to 
moderate because they are perceived to be further from constituency preferences than 
Republicans on social policy. In addition, Republicans may be constrained in their ability 
to moderate because o f close ties to conservative single-issue groups. On foreign policy, 
less than a majority o f both groups o f senators are expected to moderate. American 
voters may be less attentive to foreign policy issues because they are removed from their 
everyday experiences. However, a larger percentage o f Republicans are expected to 
moderate than Democrats because the literature suggests that Republicans are perceived 
to be further from constituency preferences.
Previous studies do not investigate the moderation hypothesis across policy areas. 
Instead, earlier researchers rely on a summary measure that collapses several policy areas 
into a general measure o f ideology. I believe this approach has confounded prior efforts 
to resolve the debate over moderation. The nature o f representation is too complex to be 
explained by relying on a measure o f general ideology. A roll-call vote on economic 
policy may involve different considerations than a vote on social policy. Therefore, it is 
necessary to investigate representation along several dimensions.
I employ a measure that has not been previously used to investigate the 
moderation hypothesis. The National Journal ratings that I use are an objective measure 
that was designed to analyze roll-call voting In addition, this measure overcomes many 
o f the inadequacies that have been noted for interest group scores (Fowler 1982; Snyder 
1992). However, for my purposes, one o f the most important benefits o f the National 
Journal ratings is that they are reported in three discrete policy areas. These scores are
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calculated in the areas o f economic, social, and foreign policy. This enables me to 
investigate the moderation hypothesis across policy areas. Because I differentiate 
between issue areas, I am able to develop three policy specific hypotheses, which result in 
a more refined test o f reelection moderation.
This approach permits me to offer a more detailed answer to whether senators 
moderate their voting records at election time. I find that a larger percentage o f 
Democrats, do in fact, moderate on economic policy than Republicans. Democrats are 
clearly engaging in reelection moderation, while Republicans are not. On economic policy 
voting, Republican senators tend to remain consistent over their six-year terms. On social 
policy, expectations are supported as a majority o f Democrats moderate as reelection 
approaches, while only a small percentage o f Republican senators engage in similar end- 
of-term voting behavior. Again, as in economic policy, Republicans tend to remain 
consistent over their six-year terms Although Republican senatorial voting records tend 
to remain consistent, the second most common end-of-term voting behavior is to 
moderate on economic policy and to become more extreme on social policy. On foreign 
policy, the first two classes o f Democratic voting records tend remain consistent and the 
last two classes tend to moderate, while all four classes o f Republican voting records tend 
to remain consistent throughout the six-year terms.
The moderating behavior o f Democrats implies that over the time period under 
investigation (1983-1994), they were further from constituency preferences than 
Republicans. This indicates that there is a discordance between Democratic party elites, 
the party rank-and-file, and the general electorate, which requires Democratic senators to
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scramble at election time. The evidence shows that Republicans tend to remain consistent 
in their voting behavior, which implies they are already quite near median constituency 
preferences.
Previous studies do not offer the detailed findings that are provided here. 
Differentiating between policy areas has enhanced this investigation. Being able to clearly 
identify the difference between voting records becoming moderate, more extreme, and 
remaining consistent helps to clarify end-of-term voting behavior. Also, the emphasis 
placed on developing different expectations for Democrats and Republicans has proven to 
be beneficial, as evidenced by the fact that they display different voting behaviors across 
policy areas throughout their senatorial terms.
The results on social policy are perhaps the most interesting findings presented. It 
appears that Democratic senatorial voting records may be more extreme than median 
constituency preferences during the first four years o f their terms. This may be why so 
many o f them engage in reelection moderation. Republicans, on the other hand, appear to 
be more closely attuned to constituency preferences on social policy. This is consistent 
with the assertions o f Tatalovich and Daynes (1988), who claim that Republican party 
identifiers and the general electorate hold similar preferences on social policy. As a result, 
on social policy senate Republicans tend to remain consistent over their six-year terms. In 
addition, the Republicans who do not display end-of-term voting consistency, tend to 
become more extreme. This may be the result o f close Republican ties to conservative 
single issue groups.
McCrone and Kuklinski (1979) suggest that legislators are responsive to
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constituency preferences when two conditions exist. First, legislators must think o f 
themselves as delegates and second, constituents must send consistent messages. I believe 
that end-of-term shifting behavior is a reflection o f these conditions. During a reelection 
campaign, voters are more likely to be attentive and to be sending clearer signals o f policy 
preferences. In addition, since senators are trying to stay in office, they are more likely to 
represent constituency preferences.
My research suggests that senators are in fact responsive, especially when the 
electorate is attentive. Democrats moderate because they are farther from constituency 
preferences than Republicans. Their end-of-term moderation is an attempt to appeal to 
the preferences o f the median voter. The lack o f moderation o f Republican senators 
implies that they have voting records that are already quite near median constituency 
preferences, hence, their consistent voting records. At a minimum, elections may provide 
the accountability necessary to cause representation to occur.
This is when representatives are paying attention to the represented and trying to 
win their approval. In addition, during intense election campaigns is when the electorate 
is probably most attentive. Even i f  many Americans are inattentive, senators behave as i f  
they believe their voting records are being watched (Arnold 1990). At least in the areas o f 
economic and social policy, it appears that Democratic senators believe that their voting 
records are important at election time. However, it also suggests that senators are more 
responsive when the electorate is attentive. I f  this only happens during the election cycle, 
then who is at fault, senators or voters? Policy representation is a two way process and it 
requires the efforts o f both the representative and the represented.
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I believe that one o f the most significant contributions o f this research is that it 
suggests new directions for future investigations o f representation. The proposition that 
senators become more responsive at election time implies that they are unresponsive early 
in their terms. While this suggests that senators are trustees early in their terms and 
become delegates toward the end o f their terms, I believe that such an inference provides 
an oversimplified and inaccurate picture o f representation in the U.S. Senate.
I f  reelection is a tantamount concern, then every vote, even some seemingly 
inconsequential ones, involves the calculus o f what it means “back home” (Arnold 1990). 
Senators who ask such questions are concerned with at least the appearance o f 
responsiveness. In fact, I believe senators are rarely unresponsive. I f  it appears that a 
senator is unresponsive, it is probably because we are asking the wrong questions and 
looking to the wrong constituencies.
Elaborating on this idea will require linking constituency preferences to senatorial 
voting records. This approach has been attempted (Ahuja 1994; Bernstein 1991; Wright 
and Berkman 1986); however, delineating the preferences between the personal, primary, 
reelection, and geographical constituencies (Fenno 1978) has not been attempted by those 
testing the moderation hypothesis. I believe that early in a senatorial term, when it 
appears that senators are less responsive, they are not being unresponsive, but instead are 
responding to their personal and primary constituencies.
It is theoretically unsound to compare a general constituency measure o f ideology 
to senatorial voting records during the first four years o f a term to investigate policy 
congruence. This constituency may contain many individuals that only become attentive
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during reelection campaigns. Therefore, these individuals are probably not sending 
consistent messages about policy preferences and are inattentive at the beginning o f a 
senator’s term. Voting records from the first four years o f a senator’s term should be 
linked to a constituency o f attentive voters. Party activists are this attentive constituency.
Since these voters are more attentive, these are the people to whom a senator is 
most likely responding. During the early years o f a term, the general public is less 
attentive. As a result, senators are responsive to the party identifiers who are attentive 
and perhaps sending more defined messages regarding policy preferences. Fenno (1978) 
refers to these individuals as the personal and primary constituencies. These votes are 
necessary for a primary election victory and responsiveness to this constituency may even 
lessen the chances o f drawing a challenger in the primary.
The picture becomes more complicated at election time. This is when the general 
public becomes more attentive. Although voters from the personal and primary 
constituencies are part o f the reelection constituency, unless they comprise a majority o f 
the electorate, it becomes necessary to appeal to the voters who only become attentive 
during election campaigns. They are found in the middle o f the ideological spectrum, 
hence the need to moderate. However, a senator is still constrained by the preferences o f 
their party identifiers. As a result, moderating, in an attempt to appeal to the median 
voter, is tempered by the need to satisfy the policy preferences o f party identifiers.
The move to the middle is clouded by uncertainty. The preferences o f the general 
electorate are harder to discern than those o f party activists, whose preferences are 
probably clearer and whose votes are more certain. This is where the problem lies. To
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win reelection, the voters in the middle must be won, but a senator is constrained from 
moving too far to the middle because the more ideological voters cannot be lost. 
Therefore, a political tightrope must be walked in which a senator gambles with the 
certainty o f the personal and primary constituencies against the uncertainty o f the 
reelection constituency
I f  senators consistently become more moderate at the end o f their terms, the 
assumption can be made based on the moderation hypothesis that they are appealing to 
the median voter to win reelection. I f  ideological movement is required to satisfy the 
policy preferences o f the median voter, then during the first four years o f their terms, 
senators have not been consistently representing these preferences. Either they are 
behaving as independent agents (e g. trustees), or they are responding to a different 
constituency. My research suggests it is the latter.
Future research should investigate how senators interact with each o f their 
constituencies at different periods throughout their terms. This study suggests that 
making a distinction between the primary, reelection, and geographic constituencies may 
add to our understanding o f patterns o f moderation as well as to the nature o f senatorial 
representation. Senators may be representing their personal and primary constituencies 
during the first four years o f their terms, which results in voting records that are more 
extreme than general constituency preferences. As reelection approaches, senators may 
need to appeal to voters in the wider geographic constituency to attract enough support to 
build a reelection coalition, which necessitates moderation to attract the median voter.
Verification o f these proposals would alter present conceptions about
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representation. It would imply that senators receive more constituency “ control” than is 
suggested by Arnold’s (1993) Alternative Control Model. First, messages come from 
members o f the primary constituency throughout senatorial terms, then as elections 
approach, senators might also receive messages from their geographic constituency. One 
o f Arnold’ s (1993) assumptions is that legislators are “ monitored” by activists, 
challengers, and interest groups that act as policing agents and inform the public when 
legislators go awry. This would need to be expanded to include same party activists who 
are an attentive public that probably have outcome (or policy) preferences that are more 
extreme than those of the general electorate. Same party activists probably “ monitor” in 
the way that Arnold (1993) suggests, but also encourage some policy extremism.
Moreover, these party activists probably have clearer outcome, as well as, policy 
preferences, which may result in more defined messages being sent to legislators. This 
would imply that senators behave more as instructed delegates than as Arnold’s (1993) 
“ controlled agents”. To discern whether these assertions are accurate will require linking 
the appropriate constituency (personal, primary, reelection, and geographic) data to the 
corresponding period during a senator’s term. One possible approach would be to use 
constituency data from same party identifiers to attempt to establish a link to the first four 
years o f a senator’s term.
In sum, this thesis has shown that over the time period under investigation (1983- 
1994), Democratic senators engage in reelection moderation on economic and social 
policy. On foreign policy their voting records tend to remain consistent over their six-year 
terms in the first two classes, while senators in the last two classes display moderating
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behavior. Republicans display different end-of-term voting behaviors than their 
Democratic counterparts. They are not moderating. In all three policy areas, Republican 
senatorial voting records tend to remain consistent throughout their terms.
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31 Table a proposal to emphasize private-sector jobs for summer employment
programs for youths. Feb. 8. (50-43) L-3
32 Approve a new federal program to aid students seeking jobs. Feb. 8 (62-31)
L-3
48 Amend the Constitution to require a balanced budget by 2001, with provision
a waiver by a three-fifths vote in both the House and the Senate. March 1.
(63-37; failed to receive the required two-thirds vote) L-2
49 Confirm the nomination o f W illiam  B. Gould IV  as a member o f the National
Labor Relations Board. March 2. (58-38) L-3 
55 Table a proposal to reduce to $1.5 b illion the authorization for the national 
competitiveness program. March 10. (49-43) L-3 
78 Freeze domestic spending levels for the next five years March 24. (32-667)
L-2
82 Approve the fiscal 1995 budget resolution, including a deficit o f $174 billion.
March 25. (57-40). L-3
118 Table a proposal to require Davis-Bacon Act wage requirements for
contractors on federal drinking water projects. May 18 (52-46) L-3 
152 Require that half of air traffic controllers be from the group fired by the 
Reagan Administration in 1981 June 16 (29-65) C-2 
189 End debate on a motion to consider a b ill that would bar employers from
hiring permanent replacements for striking workers. July 13 (53-46; failed to 
receive the required 60 votes) C-3
220 Table a proposal to reduce fiscal 1995 transportation spending to $13.6 
billion. July 21. (72-28) L-2
260 Eliminate $135 m illion in community development grants from the Housing 
and Urban Development Department. Aug. 4. (27-71) L -1 
288 Require that all health insurance policies cover preventive services for 




25 Authorize $30 m illion for school choice programs in  low-income areas.
Feb.8. (41-52) L-2
28 Prohibit federally financed distribution o f condoms, contraceptives or drugs 
without parental consent. Feb. 8. (34-59) L-3
50 Table a proposal to delay compliance for pesticide-safety regulations for farm 
workers. March 9. (35-65) C-2
92 Confirm Rosemary Barkett as an appellate court judge. April 14. (61-37) L-3
99 Table a proposal to establish a privacy protection commission for electronic
data and fair information practices. May 4. (77-21) C -1 
106 Express the sense o f the Senate in opposition to "racial justice" provisions
assigned to prevent discrimination in death penalty cases. May 11.(58-41 )C-2 
112 Approve a conference report establishing federal penalties for individuals who 
obstruct or block access to abortion clinics. May 12. (69-30) L-2 
115 Table a ban on penalties against communities that cannot afford to comply 
w ith the Safe Drinking Water Act. May 17 (56-43) L-3 
124 Instruct conferees to insist on mandatory minimum prison sentences for 
certain drug offenders. May 19. (66-32) C-2
126 Instruct conferees to insist on a mandatory prison term for the use o f a firearm
during a state criminal offense. May 19. (51-47) C -1
127 Bar federal funds for the Martin Luther King Jr. federal holiday commission.
May 24 (28-70) L-2
191 Prohibit the expenditure o f federal funds to change population control laws in
other laws in other nations. July 14. (42-58) L-3 
223 Table a proposal to prohibit the Legal Services Corp. from aiding legal 
challenges by the poor against welfare reform. July 21. (56-44) L-3 
230 Table a proposal to prohibit the National Endowment for the Arts from 
financing certain projects. July 25 (49-42) L-3 
236 Deny federal assistance to local school systems that prohibit voluntary prayer 
in public schools. July 27 (47-53) L-3
244 Prohibit agencies receiving education funds from encouraging or supporting 
homosexuality as a lifestyle. Aug. 1. (63-36) C-2 
295 Approve the crime bill. Aug. 25. (61-38) L-3




3 Table a proposal to express the sense o f Congress in  favor o f establishing an 
international criminal court Jan. 26. (55-45) L-3 
6 Require a fu ll accounting o f the U.S prisoners o f war and missing-in-action
before the United States lifts its trade embargo against Vietnam. Jan. 27. (42- 
58) L -1
11 Table a proposal to require that nations o f the former Soviet Union provide
collateral before receiving bilateral and international loans. Jan. 28.(60-33)L-2 
14 Extend immigration-law protections to certain oppressed Russian Jews and
evangelical Christians seeking entry into the United States. Feb. 1 .(85-15)L-1
16 Express the Senate's sense that the President urge further progress by China in
meeting most-favored-nation trade standards Feb 1 (61-39) L-3
17 Table a proposal barring U.S. security assistance to nations that vote with the
United States on fewer than 25 per cent o f U N. votes. Feb. 2. (66-34) L-2 
46 Confirm Stobe Talbott as deputy secretary o f State. Feb. 22. (66-31) L-3
64 Transfer $513 m illion from the ballistic missile defense program March 22.
(40-59) C-3
111 Require the President to terminate the U.S. arms embargo o f Bosnia at the 
request of that nation May 12. (50-49) C-2 
130 Confirm Derek Shearer as ambassador to Finland. May 24 (67-31) L-3 
132 End debate on the nomination o f Sam W. Brown Jr. as head o f the delegation
to the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe. May 25. (56-42; 
failed to receive the required 60 votes) C-3
164 Table a proposal to delay construction o f a nuclear-powered aircraft carrier.
June 23. (35-61) L-3
165 Prohibit U.S. contributions to U.N. peacekeeping operations. June 23. (35-61) L-3 
179 Strike $ 150 m illion in funds earmarked to maintain the production line for the
B-2 stealth bomber. July 1. (45-55) C-2
273 Prohibit funds to expand the MILSTAR m ilitary satellite communications system Aug. 10. 
(38-62) C-2
174 Cut funds for Trident II sea-launched missiles. Aug. 10. (40-60) C-2 
277 Increase funds for antiballistic missile capabilities for the Navy's Aegis cruisers. Aug. 10. 
(38-60) L-3
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